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We are obliged to assure effective and economical
management of Governmental programs—both old and new,
effective management of Government activities enhances the
benefits of those programs* boonomloal management releases
resources for the people's use* • • • *e will continue to
offset a significant part of increased costs of important
new programs by increasing efficiency throughout the Federal
Government* Savings from this source have been substantial
during the past year under our drive for oost reduction* I
have made it clear to the heads of all Departments and
Agencies that they are to continue this emphasis on cost
reduction in the coming year* 3-
jO spoke the President in his Budget Message to Congress
on January 24, 1967* ihe President's statement on oost reduction
reflects the recent intensified effort in the Federal Government
to eliminate waste, duplication and unjustifiable expenditures of
any kind* results of the cost-reduction effort are regularly
published and given wide publicity* In Flsoal i'ear 1966 the
President reported to Congress that the department of Defense had
realized savings of 4^*5 billion through Its cost-reduction pro-
gram and that the olvillan Agencies saved $1.7 billion In the
2
same year*
U.S., President. "The President's budget Message to Con-
gress." Jan. 24, 1967. rhe budget in brief, flsoal Year 1968
(Washington, D.C.i U.s* Government Printing Office, 1967),
pp. 4 and $1.
2Ibid., p. 57-

Coat-reduction programs are not new to the federal
Government. Over the years these programs have taken many forms,
ranging from retrenchment and the reduction of Government activi-
ties to the development of new techniques to facilitate better
and more efflolent management of existing and proposed programs.
The particular cost-reduction approach at any one time has
usually reflected the philosophy of the current Administration
and the mood of Congress.
lnoe world ;ar II, a number of actions have been taken
to Improve efficiency and economy In the Federal Government.
The recommendations of the Hoover Commissions, Exeoutive reorgan-
izations and Congressional actions have all contributed to signi-
ficant Improvements In this area. These actions focused on
management Improvement as the most acceptable means to reduoe
costs. Today the retrenchment efforts of the 1920 f s are no
2longer considered the primary tool of a cost-reduction program.
i31g Government Is accepted as a necessity, and efforts are now
directed primarily toward the application of new. Improved, or
Intensified management practices to economically and efficiently
manage the large and complex programs.
Of the various programs for the Improvement and effi-
ciency of operations that have been developed In the Federal
Government, none have been as ooisprehenslve or as thoroughly
o.. ., Congress, House, Committee on Armed ervloes,
examination of Department of Defense Cost ueduotlon Program . 89th
Cong., 2nd ciess.,1966, p. 4.
Jessie Burkhead, Governmental Budgeting (New York*
John wiley and Sons, Inc., 1956), pp. 2-29»

organised as the cost-reduction program initiated by the
department of jefense in fiscal Xear 1962. The uepartment of
_efense inaugurated a program designed to reduoe costs and
improve efficiency in the management of equipment and supplies
and other operations on a ^GJ-wide basis. Various existing pro-
grams, such as value engineering and incentive contracting, were
integrated into the cost-reduction program to establish more
uniform reporting and policy guidance. As the program has pro-
gressed, comprehensive directives have been issued regarding
goals, nature of savings and detailed procedures for reporting
results*
This thesis examines one particular element of the coo
cost-reduction program—the use of value-engineering incentives
in Government contracts. Neither value engineering nor incentive
contracting are particularly new cost-reduction tools. However,
only in recent years have they been used as a method to reduoe
procurement costs in Government contracts.
statement of the Problem
/or the Government's cost-reduction program to be
effective, it must be comprehensive and must include all signifi-
cant activities. Most of the in-house, cost-reduction programs
can be directly controlled by Agenoy officials. Agency manpower
levels, paperwork management and operations, and maintenance are
1
rjcamlnation of .joj Cost aeduction Program , loo, olt .
2U.J., Department of defense, department of Jefense Cost
reduction Program— reporting system , DOD Instruction 7720.6,
January 20, 196^.

examples of the many activities in which direct cost-reduction
control can be exercised, xhe Department of Defense's ln-house,
value-engineering program is an example of a cost-reduction
effort in which the level of the effort can be directly con-
trolled by Defense officials.
Significant savings can also be realized through the
actions of organizations outside of the Federal Government.
Government contractors, and particularly defense contractors,
spend a larger portion of the Government's funds eaoh year. In
Fiscal Year 1966, the Department of Defense alone let prime
oontraots (for 110,000 or more) to 22,778 different companies and
other organizations. These contracts totaled more than 133
billion. The cost-reduction effort of these private organiza-
tions can be controlled only indirectly through the use of
incentives and other contractual devices.
oince 1962, the Department of Defense has made an inten-
sive effort to motivate defense contractors to establish affirma-
tive programs of cost reduction. To offer real motivation to
reduce costs, the incentives in contracts were expanded and
refined, and competitive bidding was extended to a number of pro-
curement aotlons. The incentives were designed to offer greater
profits for those firms cooperating in the cost-reduction program,
Value engineering is one of the many contractual incen-
tives offered to contractors to reduce costs. The value-
engineering incentive provisions first appeared in the Armed
The Wall street Journal . February ?• 1967 # p. 1.

toroes Procurement regulation in 1959* in© provisions have been
revised and updated several times since then in an effort to
incorporate constructive suggestions from industry and to make
them more effective* they have also been strengthened by pro*
viding for more liberal sharing of the savings realized through
the contractors 1 cost-reduction programs, Theoretically , the
current contractual provisions offer a vast profit potential for
defense industries that actively conduct value-engineering
programs.
This study examines the potential of value engineering
as a management tool for effecting cost reduction In Government
contracts* The study attempts to determine the extent to which
contractors are realizing the full cost-reduction potential which
value engineering offers* specifically, the study attempts to
answer the following questions i (1) what type of incentives are
most likely to motivate industry to superior performance of
contracts? (2) Considering all the pressures for satisfactory
contract performance, such as meeting specifications, engineering
performance and reliability requirements, and meeting shipment
schedules, what relative importance does the Government and the
contractor give to the contractual incentives for affirmative
cost-reduction programs? (3) How great is the real potential for
better products at lower cost through a comprehensive value-
engineering program? ikj <hat profit potential is open to con-
tractors who apply value-engineering techniques to specifications
and other contractual requirements? and (5) *hat are the signifi-
cant obstacles that reduce the effectiveness of the value-

pengineering incentives in Government contracts?
ihe Hypothesis
The hypothesis for this study is that the current pro-
curement regulations and implementing policy directives on the
use of value-engineering incentives In contracts open many new
avenues of opportunity for both Industry and Government. Industry
is offered a vast profit- improvement potential* and the Govern-
ment is afforded the opportunity to obtain greater quantities of
highly reliable goods for the funds available.
method of presentation
iwo concepts are considered in this study, xhe first is
cost reduction through incentive contracting* and the second is
cost reduction through the use of value engineering. Although
the problem centers on the integration of the two concepts* it is
necessary to understand the Implications of each. Chapter II is
devoted to an examination of the incentives for cost reduction in
Government contracts. A brief survey is made of the types and
uses of various contracts. Chapter III focuses on the use of
value engineering as a management tool for cost reduotlon.
Chapter 1/ examines the contractual aspects of value-engineering
incentives in defense contracts. This chapter will Include an
appraisal of industry's acceptance of the value-engineering pro-
visions. Chapters V and VI are devoted to an appraisal of the
results of value-engineering incentive contracting. Conclusions
and overall recommendations are contained in Chapter VII.

Limitations
ihe scope of this study is Halted to the activities of
the department of ^efense* Other Agencies of the federal Govern-
ment also have aotive oost-reductlon programs, and several use
value-engineering incentives in their contracts. But the scope
of the study Is limited to the programs of the department of
defense because it has a comprehensive contractor cost-reduction
program and has pioneered the use of value-engineering incentives
in Government contracts*
One objective of this thesis Is to provide a convenient
and concise reference for officials of all Government Agencies as
veil as or industry who wish to become more familial- with the use
of value engineering as a oost-reductlon tool, and to evaluate
its advantages, limitations, and applicability to their organisa-
tions* own activities. TO meet this objective, the subject
material is approaohed from a manager's point of view* The
technical aspects of value engineering and certain procedures and
reports applicable only to the integrated activities of the
Lepartment of defense are excluded or only briefly considered*

CEAJ II
UTIVES POa C< ^DUCTI
IN BEPE&Se, FttQGUHSXMMTS
I have, therefore, instructed the Secretary of efense
to reappraise our entire Defense strategy—our ability to
fulfill our commitments—the effectiveness, vulnerability,
and dispersal of our strategic bases, forces, and warning
systems—the efficiency and economy of our operation and
organization—the elimination of obsolete bases and installa-
tions—and the adequacy, moderilzatlon and mobility of our
present conventional and nuclear forces and weapons systems
in the light of present and future dangers.
*
1 resident John . snnedy, in his first state of the
Union Message , set the standard by which the activities of the
department of defense, and indeed the whole Federal Oovernsaent,
were to be measured during his Administration, To meet the
ohallenge offered by the President, many new and far-reaching
policies and programs have been established in the department of
Defense. The formal establishment of a Cost-deduction Program
was one of the actions taken to carry out the Presidents mandate.
The DOD Cost-P.eduction Program covers all aspects of the
Departments activities, and has taken many forms, from the
closing of bases to administrative reorganizations. This chap-
ter examines one element of the program—cost reduction In
defense procurements. It is examined within the context of the
U.S., President, "Annual Message to Congress on the
state of the Union," Publlo Papers of the Presidents—John r
.
Kennedy. 1961 . (Washington, D«C«i U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1962K p. 23.
8

overall oost-reductlon environment. The cost-reduction potential
of various types of contracts will be considered. To form a
basis for discussing the use of value -engineering Incentives, a
close examination will be made of Incentive contracting.
The ^Uiv Jost-aeduotlon Program
The OQu Cost-reduction Program was Introduced July 5.
1962. on that date the secretary of Defense, the honorable
tobert o. ^Ciiamara, reported to the President that the program
would be centered around three basic concepts t (1) buying only
what Is needed, (2) buying at the lowest sound price, and (3)
reducing operating costs* ae announced that the ultimate goal of
the cost- .eduction urogram was to realize a savings of at least
#3 billion per year by riscal iear 196?.
olnce 1962, a number of programs and policies have been
formulated to foster this environment of cost effectiveness and
cost reduction. These include such techniques as the Planning**
irogramming-budgeting system (FPB3), Integrated logistic support,
incentive contracting, the use of the weighted guideline method
for determining negotiated profit objectives, total-package and
multi-year procurements, and an intensive ln-house, value-
engineering program. These techniques have produced impressive
results.
U.S., Department of defense, t. Cost -eduction Program .
July 5, 1962, (Washington, d.C.j U.o. Government Printing
Office, 1962), p. 2.
2Xbld .. pp. 2-3.
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In July 1966, tht Secretary reported to the President
that the D00 had far ezoeeded the original cost-reduction goals
announced in July* 1962. Aa indicated in Figure 1, savings of
4.5 billion were realized in ilsoal Tear 1966* The Secretary
also reported to the President that a new savings goal of $6*1













1.4 Bii y ^Zr&^-l^GO^
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1969
Fig. 1—Progress of DO; Cost-: (eduction Prograa
uoh of the suooess of the Cost-Deduction Program can be
attributed to the support and positive influanoe of the top
Defense officials. Also Integral to the success of the prograa is
U.3., Department of Defense, LOP Cost ^eduction report .
July 5, 1962, (Washington, l.C.j 0*3* Government Printing
office, 1966), p. 1.
pop Cost reduction Deport . July 8, 1966, op. clt .. p. 2.
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the use of oost-reduotlon techniques in all sections of the
defense establishment, in the area of proouretaents from the
private sector of the economy, the need for positive cost-
reduction programs is especially important
•
k significant portion of the annual budget is paid
out to private contractors through contracts for necessary goods
and services. In recent years, the annual procurement program of
contract awards over ,10,000 by the has averaged out to
approximately >25 to 126 billion. In 1966, these figures ln-
2
creased to ,33 billion due to the Vietnam conflict. ihe nagnl-
tude of the procurement program suggests a large potential for
cost reduction.
- ef snsc . roourement Cost* .eduotlon urogram
ack<fround . Lefense procurements have always been
closely regulated by laws, regulations, and polioy directives,
i'ost of the regulations have been designed to ensure that the tax-
payer obtains a fair return for every procurement dollar paid to
Government contractors. Most of the early laws centered around
the use of advertised and negotiated procurements.
ior to world *ar II, advertised bidding was the primary
means of selecting a contractor, ihe first federal statute re-
quiring advertised bidding was enacted in 1809 • In i860, a
mi ! P iwwiiinnii wiiMP—i^w^^m^i !* — m i .— w iwi i i i —.— i mm*—mmmm*iw 1 11 i — i inw iwM^m
U«3», apartment of defense, incentive contracting uulde .
(.Washington , D«C»i U«&« Government rrintlng cfflce, 1965), p. 2.
2
>he .-all -treet Journal. February 9, 1966, p. 1.
3U.~. t 2 statutes 536 (1809>.
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landmark statute was enacted whloh required all purchases to be
advertised In advance, except for personal services and instances
where the public exigency would not permit the delay incident to
advertising. This i860 law regulated military procurements
2
until aorld Jar II.
Just prior to rforld «ar 11, Congress began to realize
that the rigid requirements for advertised bidding were not suit-
able for all types of procurements. A number of laws were en-
acted to permit negotiated procurements. The Pi ret world powers
. ct of 1941 was the last of a series of prewar procurement acts,
relaxing the requirements for advertised bidding.-'
After .orld aar II, a Navy committee was established for
the purpose of developing peacetime procurement regulations.
. rom this study evolved the Armed Services Procurement Act of
19^7. Prom this Act the Department of Defense wrote the Armed
services Procurement aegulatlon in 1956. the Act required the
return to advertised bidding as the normal procurement practice.
However, it specified 17 circumstances in .fhich negotiated pro-
curements would be appropriate.
.... . epartment of the i.avy, i^avy Contract Xiaw . 2nd
ed. f Washington, D.C.i U*«. Government Printing Office, 1959),
p. 112.
2Ibld . \.~. # 55 statutes 639 (19^1).
h
U.S., 10 United states oode 137.
^L. >., department of Defense, ..rmed services procurement
regulation , section 3t iart 2, (Washington, D.C.i U.S. Government
Printing office), (hereinafter referred to as Aojr.i).
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The above-enumerated laws, plus many other laws. Con-
gressional Inquiries and investigations, have been prompted in
part by reports of excessive profits from Government contracts.
Undoubtedly there have been some instances in which these reports
have had substance, ouch charges of abuse are outside the scope
of this study. The point is that these charges have brought
about tighter regulatory control, particularly in the area of
profit levels.
une of the major actions to eliminate exoesslve profits
from contracts was the establishment of the Renegotiation Board
in 1951* The Board is an independent Agency. It annually re*
views the aggregate profits earned by defense contractors under
certain Government contracts. It determines what profits are
excessive and orders them refunded to the Government. Decisions
of the Board may be appealed to the United states Tax Court.
Critics of the profits earned by Government contractors
too often overlook the purpose of profits and the benefits that
the Government may realize by maintaining them at a satisfactory
level. A contractor must be offered motivation to accept certain
risks inherent in Government contracts, to perform economically
and efficiently, to provide high quality products, and to take
affirmative action to reduce or eliminate unnecessary costs, one
of the key factors which motivates a contractor to perform all
these things is the anticipation of profit—profit on the current
contract and on future contracts.
IU.3., 50 United States Code, Sections 1211-1233.

lb
The irroflt motive . A profit-making organisation may, and
usually does, have multiple objectives. Many authorities on
organizational management believe that the designation of profit
as the supreme objective is a gross oversimplification of the
problem, Bttt in the long run, a company must earn a satis-
factory level of profit and return on its Investment If it is to
remain in business. Therefore, when the Government does business
with a profit-making organization, a most effective Incentive for
efficient performance is the appeal to the profit motive.
By increasing the use of competitive procurement and in-
centive contracting, the Government has acknowledged that the
profit motive offers an excellent means to induce contractors to
perform their contracts efficiently. The Government has also
recognized that profit makes up only a small percentage of the
total cost of defense procurements, and that any real reduction
2in procurement costs can only be aohieved in the cost area,
^efense procurement policies are designed to offer greater profits
and rewards to contractors who hold down procurement costs and
less profit to those who perform oontracts inefficiently. The
defense Contractor Cost-deduction Program is based primarily on
the greater use of competitive procurement and Incentive contracts.
Competitive Procurement , Competition and the "free
enterprise 11 way of doing business is a cornerstone of our
w.H, Newman and C.^. oummer, Jr*, rhe Process of Manage-
ment , (£nglewood Cliffs, N.J.j Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961),
PP. 383-385.
2
*^alph C. Nash, Incentive Contracting
. (Washington, D«C*i
The George Washington University, 1963), p. 2.
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American heritage* Companies compete for a share of the market
by developing new or better produots at lower costs. The cus-
tomer is rewarded with greater value, and the company realizes
greater profits through increased business. Maximum competition
in procurement represents sound business policy. It is one of
the most effective means for the department of Defense to
broaden the industrial base and ensure that the lowest sound
price is obtained.
Industry has three means to increase profits. It can
raise prices, lower production cost, or increase the volume of
profitable activities. A competitive climate virtually elimin-
ates significant price rises ; in fact, the trend is toward lower
prices. The volume of business depends upon the number of
successful bids at low prices. Thus, in a competitive market,
the only real avenue available to increase profits is to lower
production costs.
Value engineering Is one of the best techniques available
to industry to lower costs. As will be shown later, many com-
panies which successfully compete for contracts on a competitive
basis, also realize attractive profits by lowering production
costs through the use of value-engineering techniques.
In defense contracts, experience has shown that, on an
average, at least 25 cents is saved on each dollar shift from
noncompetitive to competitive procurement. Because of this,
the trend toward noncompetitive procurement was reversed in 1961.
Directives were Issued requiring price competition wherever
j30J Cost reduction ueport . July 8, 1966, op. olt .. p. 12.
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practicable, with sole-source procurement to be allowed only
after rigid review. As indicated in Figure 2, contracts awarded
on a competitive basis have risen from 32*9 per cent in Fiscal
lear 1961 to over k6 per cent in fiscal Year 1966. Jhis shift



















Fig* 2—Contracts Awarded on Basis of
Competition as a Per Cent of Total Dollar Value
of Contract Awards*
Advertised rrocurement . In most routine procurements,
the advantages of competition can best be obtained through formal
advertising* Under this method, the terms and conditions of the
•jvob Cost tieduoti on Report . July 5, 1962, op* oit *, p. **•
'
.xj Cost deduction report . July 8, 1966, op* oit *. p. 12,
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oontract are set forth and qualified vendors are Invited to make
bids. Sealed bids are submitted by Interested parties. These
bids are publicly opened at a specified time and the contract is
awarded to the responsible bidder whose bid is most advantageous
to the Government, considering price and other faotors.
e effectiveness of formal advertising is dependent upon
an adequate number of qualified bidders and a reliable means for
the Government and the contractor to determine, within a reason-
able range, the cost to perform the contract, rhe growing pre-
ponderance of research and development oontracts and contracts
for limited production of complex weapons has placed some limita-
tions on formal advertisli z as a method of procurement.
Negotiated Contracts . During the past deoade the pace of
military technology has accelerated, and the number and complexity
of specialized defense products has multiplied. Kajor weapons
systems now depend heavily upon advanoed science and technology,
and this has resulted in Increased expenditures. The procurement
of these advanoed systems is extremely complex because of the
uncertainty of the design and production costs, the required lead
time, and even the uncertain level of desired performance. In
such an atmosphere of uncertainty and risk, the use of competitive
procurement breaks down. Hitch and :*cKean sum up the problem
this ways
vhen goods and servloes are purchased by government
agencies on the basis of full and free competitive bidding,
there is a presumption that competitive forces, working
through the price and market mechanism, will provide the same
spur to efficiency and low-cost supply that they do elsewhere
ASPn, Section II, Part 2.
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In the private economy. 3ut only a rather minor portion of
ierwloe purchases are made, or oan be made, on the basis of
competitive bld.Llng. b expensive items of major equip-
ment like aircraft, submarines, and tanks and their expensive
major components can be produced by very few companies, and
their production oosts are seldom accurately estimated in
advance, ."oreover, frequent and extensive modifications of
the original design are the rule rather than the exception
both in development and in production. In these circum-
stances "negotiated" contracts and the "cost-plus" type are
widely used. 1
ly of the defense procurements are of such magnitude
and complexity that only a few select companies are capable of
bidding on them. These large procurements are characterized by a
unique set of uncertainties such that even the seleot few indus-
trial giants are unwilling to assume the risk on bidding for the
contract on a firm-fixed-] rice basis. Under the fixed-price
contract, where uncertainties regarding cost are extreme, the
actual price established through competitive bidding may be far
off the mark. In such a case, if the bid is far too low, a single
large oontraot oan force a major company into bankruptcy.
Through negotiations, the Government and the potential contractors
are free to discuss and bargain on many aspects of the planned
procurement, Much of the negotiating centers around the amount
of price risk the contractor will assume under the contract.
A negotiated procurement has the same objective as an
advertised procurement—the best possible terms for the Govern-
ment. Negotiated procurements do not preclude competition,
several potential contractors may submit proposals to serve as a
basis for negotiations. Unlike formal advertising, however,
Charles J. hitch and .tonald N. KoKean, The Economic a of
jefense In the ivuolear Age
.
(New Xorkt Atheneum, I960;, p. 230.
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negotiated procurements are not solely dependent upon the inter-
action of competitive forces, xhls lack of full competition
lowers the incentive to hold costs down* To compensate for this
reduced competitive incentive, other types of cost-reduction
incentives are required in negotiated contracts.
j-'ypes of Contracts
Government contracts can be grouped into two main cate-
gories, i'hese are fixed-price contracts and cost-reimbursement
contracts.
ilxed-irloe Contracts . As a class, fixed-price contracts
are more desirable than cost-reimbursement contraots. Fixed
-
prioe contracts are characterized as follows: (1) A maximum
price ceiling is set. (2) ihe contractor assumes the maximum
risk. (3) Fewer administrative problems are involved. (4) They
are generally written when specific and detailed items can be
made available. And (5) pricing oan be fairly well established.
Ihere are four main types of fixed-prloe contracts. They
are: (1) Firm, (2) ^determinable, (3) escalation, and (4)
Inoentive. ^he Government considers the Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP)
contract to be the most desirable and encourages its use whenever
circumstances permit. Under the PFP contract, the contractor
assumes all the risks and responsibilities. His profit depends
upon his ability to reduce costs, For this reason the PFP con-
tract gives the oontraotor the maximum incentive to avoid waste
and to use suoh cost-reduction techniques as value engineering.
rhe Fixed -rrice with Frovlslon-for-Escalatlon contract
generally provides for a price modification when a change occurs
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in the cost of labor or material. The change is normally based
on a recognized price index. A Fixed-Price with ProTi sion-for-
dedetermination contract provides a means for shifting some risk
to the Government, thus avoiding contingency fees in a FFP con-
tract* ihe final prioe is determined at various steps during
the contract or after the contract* The Fixed-Prloe-Incentive
(FPU type contract will be examined later under incentive
contracting.
Cost-iielmburaeaent Contracts . The oost-reimbursement-
type contracts are normally used when a fair contract price can-
not be established. The Government pays all allowable contract
costs. There are four major cost-reimbursement contracts. They
are: (1) otraight-Cost, (2) Cost-Sharing, (3) Cost-Plus-Fixed
-
Fee, and (k) Cost-i lue-Inoentlve-i ee.
Under the straight-Cost-type contract, all allowable
oosts are reimbursed, but the contractor receives no fee. The
Cost-Sharing contract also provides for no fee. In addition, the
contractor shares the contract oosts with the Government accord-
ing to an established formula, ihe straight-Cost and Cost-
Sharing contracts are normally used in oases where the contractor
receives some commercial benefit as a result of the work per-
formed under the contracts.
Under the Cost-Plus-Fixed-fee contract (CPFF), the
Government agrees to bear all the oosts incident to the contract
and, in addition, pays the oontraotor a fixed fee for his effort.
This type of contract has several advantages. It permits the
work to get underway rapidly, with no lengthy preliminary
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negotiations, and it is particularly suited for highly uncertain
situations.
ihe contract also has several distinct disadvan-
tages. First, experience has shown that there is little competi-
tion when such contracts are negotiated. Second, there is
little incentive to produce efficiently when all allowable costs
are reimbursed and the fee is fixed in advance, because of
these disadvantages, a major goal of the DOD Cost-Deduction
rrogram is to reduce the number of OPPP oontraots. Currently the
proportion of CFFP oontraots awarded have reaohed a rate of 8.9
per cent with the peak of 38 per cent recorded in Karon, 1961.
The last type of cost-reimbursement-type contract, the
Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee, will be examined below.
Incentive Contracts . Incentive contracts offer the most
attractive alternative when the use of tWt contracts is impos-
sible or inappropriate. The essence of the incentive contract
is that it offers a contractor more profit if he reduces costs or
improves performance, and less profit if costs increase or per-
formance goals are not met.-* iince 1961, a goal of the DOD Cost-
deduction Program has been to use incentive contracts in
instances where ret contracts are not applicable.
Incentive-type oontraots are designed to motivate
Improved contractor performance in the areas of cost, performance,
and delivery, rhe contractor cannot improve profits by reducing
iitch and Kc>ean, op. clt .. p. 231.
2
v. Cost ^eduction leport . July 8, I966, op. clt. . p. 14.
^Nash, pp. clt .. p. 1.
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costs at the expense of performance, rather, he must find ways
to provide equal or better products at lower costs If he is to
realize the maximum benefits under incentive contracts. Value
engineering, as will be demonstrated, is a powerful tool for
achieving that objective.
In essence, nearly all incentives in Government contracts
take the form of sharing arrangements* Their common feature is
that the contractor is permitted to keep a part of any cost
savings, relative to some "target" cost named in the contraot,
and he is penalised by some part of any costs in excess of the
target, The target cost represents the best mutually determined
estimate of what the contraot cost will actually be. The target
cost should represent that figure at which there is equal proba-
bility of either a cost overrun or underrun. The achievement of
a good target cost is not an easy process, but with the develop-
ment and use of such techniques as Pgai and its extension, FEul/
2
COST, this task is becoming increasingly manageable.
Xhe sharing arrangements under incentive oontraots are
normally expressed as a percentage ratio, /or example, if a 50/
50 sharing arrangement is negotiated, the Government and the con-
tractor will share equally all the costs incurred in excess of
the negotiated target cost. Conversely, the Government and the
contractor will be sharing equally, all savings realized if the
actual cost of the contract is below the negotiated target cost.
The profit or fee is thus tuned to the contractor's ability to
Nash, op. oit .. pp, **-5»
2




The two baslo types of incentive contracts are the r'ixed-
Prloe-incentive Contract (FPI) and the Cost-flus-Inecntive-Pee
2Contract (CPIP). Both appeal to the profit motive by Increasing
or decreasing the contractor 1 s profit or fee, on the basis of
some predetermined formula, as his actual oosts fall above or
below the contract target cost.
The fll contract contains a target cost, a target profit,
a oelling price and a sharing formula. After the work Is com-
pleted, the contractor and the Government negotiate the final
costs of the contract, sharing the overruns and underruns accord-
ing to the agreed-upon formula, .regardless of the final cost to
the contractor, he must meet the contractual specifications, and
the Government's liability cannot exoeed the predetermined cell-
ing price. For this reason the Government prefers this type of
contract to any other cost-relmbursement-type contract whenever
clroumstances permit.''
ihe CPIF-type contract differs from the FPI contract In
that It has no fixed celling price, has a range of cost sharing
limited by the maximum and minimum fee, and Is settled by voucher-
k
lng all costs. CFIP contracts are normally employed where there
Is not a high degree of confidence In the cost estimate. The
sharing formula employed In CPIF contracts vary greatly according
to the degree of confidence In the cost estimate.
^Pu, 3-40^.4. 2Ibld .. 3-*K)5. k.
3
•^Incentive Contracting Guide , op. olt .. p. 5.
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There is substantial evidence that the cost-reduction
efforts of the Defense Department are accepted. If not welcomed,
as a necessary part of doing business with the Government . As
one industry official put it:
If you 1 re interested in your paycheck, then you have to
be interested in cost reduction and oost avoidance too. For
it has become clearly evident that each and every defense
company will have to emphasize thrift and frugality more
than ever before and devise new ways to give the customer a
dollar's value for every dollar spent*1
Historically, one of the sharpest thorns pricking Industry
has been overmanagement in contracting* The new techniques
employed to reduoe costs in defense contracts places greater, not
lesser, constraints on industry, realizing this, Dtifi has
attempted to compensate with higher profits* ome industry exec-
utives, however, contend that regulations extend far beyond
profits* fir. harry Benoit, Jr., manager of the Government Con-
tracts Department of Barnes Engineering Company states that
despite many allegations to the contrary. Government contracts
are not lucrative from a profit viewpoint, yet the rigid regula-
tions entail many problems and unnecessarily curtail management
2prerogative* Hitch and HoKean rebut this often-heard allegation
of excessive regulations as follows i
x he relaxation of contractual constraints, while highly
desirable in itself, depends upon the development of satis-
factory substitutes for "cost-plus," lightly or wrongly (we
Howard g« Lee, "*hat We've vane About reducing Cost,"
Armed rorces Management * Dec*, 1964, p* 4?.
2Harry Benoit, Jr., "Can we Have Government Contracts and
Free Dnterprlse/, " I'inanolal executive * oept*, 1963# P* 39»
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think rightly), the Congress and the public are determined
that contractors be kept from cheating on cost-plus, even to
the point of being willing to sacrifice some efficiency to
prevent fraud (or just excessive pocket-lining) • An adequate
Incentive plan or adequate competition would be far more
effective in preventing abuses than rules and contracting
offioers. • ., but until we develop such a substitute we are
stuok with the rules •
1
All contractors are encouraged to intensify their efforts
to realize cost reduction in the performance of defense con-
tracts. For those contractors having an overall annual volume of
defense sales in exoess of $5 billion, exclusive of Firm-Fixed
-
Prloe contracts, a special contractor cost-reduction program has
2been established. Contractors who accept the invitation to
report their accomplishments under this program submit their
oost-reduotlon results to the D€D twioe yearly for evaluation.
Their accomplishments are widely publicized and are considered in
making future source selections and in determining profit and fee
ratas in noncompetitive negotiated contracts. By Flsoal Year
1966, seventy-five firms had volunteered to participate in the
special program*
In September, 1966, a special committee of Congress
issued a report that was highly critical of the DOD Cost-
Itch A MoKean, op. clt .. p. 233.
2U.^., department of defense, defense Contractor Cost
reduction Program . DOD Instruction 7720.12, January 18, 1965,
3eotion iv-c.
3Ibld .. iv-li.
U«3», department of Defense, Cost ;eduction Actiona ay
Defense Contractors . Kay 1966, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment printing office, 1966), p. vli.
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^eduotlon Program* rhe report questioned the validity of many
of the olalmed savings, The report conourred wltV- In the
need for a cost-reduction program, but then went on to state:
ihe sprinkling of a few true savings actions in a pot
containing many which are either invalid or questionable
does not turn the mixture into pure gold. Instead, the
debased result could make the whole program suspect,
causing it to lose its value and force as a powerful aid
to real economy* 2
ihe committee examined a number of oases of claimed
savings under the Cost-Deduction Program* It uncovered some
instances where true savings were questionable or where documen-
tation failed to support the claimed savings* In other
instances the committee reported that savings were realized at
the expense of degraded military capability. •*
Dr« .janiel Borth, of the General Accounting office takes
a slightly different approach to the Cost-, eduction Program*
He suggests that cost reduction and motivation must be tied to-
gether* A cost-reduction program provides a vehicle to formally
acknowledge action taken to reduce costs and improve efficiency*
It costs the Government very little to be generous in its praise
and rewards for cost-reduction efforts by organizations and indi-
viduals, ^ome efforts may result in questionable true savings or
may be difficult to document* But in terms of morale and motiva-
tion t it is better to give too much rather than too little
oredlt* In the long run, a continuing cost-reduction effort will
jxaainatlon of ...•.>: Jost ^eduction Program , op* olt *
2Ibld *. p. 3 3Ibld *. pp. 27-*K>.
personal interview with >r. ;.anlel oorth, Associate
director. Management Control ystems, Defense Division, U. .
General Accounting office. Jan* 31, 196?*
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produce substantial true savings. For this reason. It may not
be fair to Judge the value of the program by examining Isolated
questionable oases.
nummary and Conclusions
"ince 1961, the Department of Defense has initiated far-
reaohing programs in the area of cost reduction. The DOD has
reported substantial dollar savings from these programs. . espite
its critics, there is every indication that the oost-reduotion
effort will be intensified and broadened in future years.
Cost reduction in defense procurements is a major element
of the total DOD program. The renewed emphasis on competitive
procurements and the increased use of Firm-Fixed-Price and
Incentive-type contracts has resulted in significant savings.
This thesis questions what types of incentives are most
likely to motivate industry to superior performance. The evidence
in this chapter supports a tentative broad answer. The Incen-
tives must be keyed to the profit motive, must be real, not token,
and must be administered consistently. Also questioned by this
thesis is the importance of cost reduction to the Government
relative to the numerous other contract considerations such as
performance and quality requirements and delivery schedules. The
evidence is clear that oost reduction is not secondary to any
contract requirements. Conversely, a contractor is expected to
provide increasingly superior products within specified time
periods—all at lower overall costs.
In conclusion, it may be stated that a most favorable
cost-reduction climate has been created in the department of
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defense, rhls climate fosters the use of all effective cost-
reduction tools. The study will now shift to an examination of




PRINCIPLES OF VALUE ENGINEERING
Introduction
e value of the cost-reduction incentives offered to the
contractor is ultimately measured in terms of the results of the
contractor's cost-reduction efforts. A contractor may be highly
motivated, but if he is unable to apply the appropriate cost-
reduction techniques, he will have poor results. Value engineer-
ing is one of the better cost-reduction tools available to the
defense contractor.
Value engineering, or value analysis as It is often
called, is a unique cost-reduction method which was developed and
perfected in the late 19^0»s by Lawrence . lies of the General
:ctric Company. It was developed in response to the need for
more cost consciousness in the design, development, production
and maintenance of complex equipment. As the ever Increasing
pace of technological advances in the 1950 f s and 1960 , s focused
more attention on this need, value engineering gained wide
acceptance by industrial firm*, both large and small. It has
been the subject of numerous articles, conferences, and symposia,
and more recently it has been cffeied as a formal academic course
Lamar Lee, Jr., and Donald */. Nobler, Purchasing and
.erlals management





by a number of universities.
.2 department of defense's interest in value engineering
results from an awareness of its potential contribution toward
2
cost effectiveness in the acquisition of defense materials*
From an economic point of view, there is only a limited amount
of resources available for defense materials. Jhia limitation
requires the use of resources in suoh a manner as to maximize
output. Value engineering, from the economic standpoint, con-
tributes to the efficiency with which allocated resources are
used. It can help make it possible to obtain maximum defense for
a given amount of resources.
A clear understanding of value engineering is essential
if it is to achieve its potential as a significant cost-reduction
tool in defense procurement. A knowledge of what constitutes
value in defense products and how value engineering affects
product value is essential. This chapter is devoted to a dis-
cussion of the concepts and techniques of value engineering and
its praotioal application and use in industry and Government.
Value ijiglneering Defined
jieoause of its many applications, a number of definitions
have been used to describe value engineering. Basically, value
I ersonal interview with i . idj .emptor, value £j&gineer«
Ing _ivision. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(I- an. 12, 196?» (hereinafter referred to as tempter
Interview).
2
U.3«, Department of defense. Value Engineering Handbook .
U--111). naroh 29. 1963, (Washington. D.C.i 0.3. Government
Printing office, 1963). p. 1.
-^ itch and fccKean, op. clt .. pp. 23-^3«
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engineering Is ooncemod with the ell mlnatlac or modification of
anything that contributes to the oost of an item Out Is not
necessary to required performance, quality* maintainability,
reliability, standardization or interohangeablllty. ^awrence . .
Klles defines value engineering this way*
Value analysis Rvalue engineering! is a philosophy
implemented by the use of a specific set of techniques* a
body of Knowledge, and a grout) of learned skills. *t is an
organized creative approach which has for its purpose the
efficient identification of unnecessary cost* i.e., cost
which provides neither eualltv nor use nor life nor appear*
ance nor customer features .1
'.his rather high-powered definition has been reworded into the
context of activities. Jhe icpartinent of * efense defines it
as follows:
Value engineering Is an organized effort directed at
analyzing the function of defense hardware with the purpose
of achieving the required function at the lowest oost .2
Value engineering recuses on one objective—equivalent
performance mt lower costs. his differentiates, it i'rou the
traditional methods of cost reduction which offer trade-offs
between performance and cost* Value engineering does not look
for cost performance trade-offs. , rather it looks for ways to
improve quality and reliability at lower costs. :he key words In
*s definition of value engineering are value, funotion and
organised approach.
Value , to fully understand value engineering, it is
necessary to oonslder what constitutes value in products. ,he
K. . lies, echnlQUCQ or /due Analysis and Hnglncor-
log
.
(Me* York: ftetfraw-dill "CO* ,o., 1961], p. 1.
It
Value frnqlnoertn* .and boo* , pp. olt .. p. 2.

word value has many meanings to different people. The dictionary
dwells at considerable length on the many meanings of value.
within the context of value engineering, value refers to relative
worth, utility or importance.
Although value is a broad term, it has been categorized
so that it can be defined meaningfully, .our such categories are:
Xuse Value: Based on the properties and qualities of
a product or material which accomplish a
use, work or service.
^Cost Value: aased on the cost of a product, almost
always expressed in money.
Esteem Values Based on the properties, features or
attractiveness Involved in pride of
ownership of the product.
Exchange Value: Based on the properties or qualities
which make the product exchangeable for
something else.*
The real value of a product probably embodies all of the preced-
ing factors and more, For each produot, the Importance of the
different categories of value varies from person to person, from
customer to producer. An automobile dealer views the automobile
in terms of its exchange value. The potential customer views the
same vehicle in terms of its use value versus cost value, esteem
value, and trade-in or exchange value.
For the vast majority of defense hardware, use value and
cost value are virtually the only factors of significance.^
Webster's Kew Collegiate ilctlonary . ( Springfield,
Mass. : G. £ C. Merrlam Co., 1953) • P« 9^0.




Esteem and exchange values are negligible compared to use value.
Fortunately, use and cost value can be stated in terms of oper-
ating requirements of functional characteristics, and cost value
can be stated in terms of dollars.
In the Department of Defense, the value-engineering
approach to products is that use value should equal or exceed the
cost value* The value of the end produot approaches its maximum
if its cost is made up solely of features which contribute to its
use and do not include any factors which contribute cost toward
esteem or exchange. A value-engineering goal is the maximization
of end-product value through the control of use value and cost
value and the costs associated with any other value.
Secretary RoNamara stated his oase for the elimination of
oostly esteem and exchange value in defense products this ways
There is no point in paying for performance or quality
features that are not needed to accomplish the essential
task. In a meaningful sense, procurement of excessive per-
formance or quality ... is just as wasteful as procurement
of excessive quantities. 2
Hr. ftoNamara characterizes defense products with excessive quality
and value characteristics as "goldplated." The elimination of
goldplating in defense products is a major goal of the DOD Cost-
Reduction Program,
U.S., Department of Defense, Principles and Applications
of Value Engineering . (Washington, D»C7i Office of Assistant
Secretary of Defense (I&L)), pp. 1-3*
2
E.3. McNamara, "Statement Before the Subcommittee on
Defense Procurement, Maroh 28, 19^3 •" An Introduction to Value
inglneering . (Redstone Arsenal, Alabama t U.S. Army Missile
Command), p. 3.
^DOD cost reduction aeport . July 8, 1966, op. pit ., p. 9»
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T Although cost and use value can be stated precisely,
value is always relative, not absolute* nigh value is a function
of both use and cost values and the relation between them. For
example, an item with only an average use value, but below aver*
age cost value, may have higher value than one which is above
average in use value but is obtainable only at a very high cost*
Such relationships are also the basis for the systems-analysis
techniques and cost- effectiveness studies which have been intro-
duced in the DOD«
Function , The value of a product is measured in terms of
its function* Value-engineering studies focus on the function
which the product performs rather than on the product itself*
They take nothing for granted and attack everything about the
product, including the item itself, subject only to the restric-
tion that the required function must not be changed* In other
words, they look at functional value rather than product value*
The studies seek minimum cost by considering the various methods
of achieving the required function rather than by considering
ways of reducing cost of a specific method* Only after the
function of the product is considered, is the product Itself
evaluated* The consideration of the function is the fundamental
2
skeletal structure of the value-engineering method*
Function describes the purpose or objective of a product*
In simple terms, functional requirements are those explicit
Charles J. riiteh, Oeolsion ftaklng for defense . (Berkeley,
Calif. i University of Calif. Iress, 1965), pp. ^3-58.
.principles and Applications of Value Engineering .
op. clt *. pp* 1-4*
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performance characteristics that must be possessed by the hard*
ware if it is "to work." They define the limits of what the
hardware must be able to do in relation to the larger system of
which it is a part*
In attempting to define the function of a product, it is
helpful to desorlbe it in the form of two words, a verb and a
noun* ror instance, the function of a light bulb is to "provide
light*" In addition to the primary function, products also have
one or more secondary functions* tor instance, a light bulb may
be required to withstand Bevaze environmental conditions* It is
important that the value engineer carefully identify all required
functions, whether they are primary or secondary*
The Job Plan * Lhe systematic or organized approach to
value engineering requires the development of a job plan* 3uch
a formal plan is instrumental in achieving best results from
value-engineering studies*
fUecause value is relative, comparison is essential in
evaluating the functions of a product. The value-engineering
approach requires answers to the following five questions:
what is the item?
What does it cost?
what does it do?
*hat else will do the Job?
«hat will that cost?2
Miles, op* clt *. p. lfc.
2>
''Arnold Curtin, "Value Analysis: Management's Cost




The purpose of these questions is to uncover needed
pertinent facts. The answers to these questions serve as the
basis for developing objective data for deoi si on-making • By
applying the answers to the primary and secondary functions of a
product, unnecessary produot costs will be Identified, alterna-
tive methods will be discovered whioh will accomplish the funotlon,
and the oost of alternatives will be available for comparison*
The value-engineering Job plan was developed by Lawrence
. Miles* Many versions of the plan have been adapted by the
Government and industry to meet a variety of needs* Presupposing
that an item has been selected for study, the phases of a typioal
2
Job plan might prooeed in the following manner
t
Information Phase * The first phase of the Job plan is to
gather faots, analyze the function whioh the product
performs and establish criteria against which possible
improvements can be made*
Speculative Phase * In this phase, alternatives are developed
which offer potential solutions to the value problem*
evaluation Phase * In this step of the value-engineering
process, the various alternatives whioh have been
developed are subjected to a test of their economic
feasibility* Eaoh alternative is costed, with the goal
of ranking the feasible solutions according to their cost*
The oost considered must include the unit costs, imple-
mentation costs, estimating the number of units to which
the change will apply as well as the oost of supporting
and maintaining the alternative method*
Testing and Verification Phase * At this point all the econom-
ically feasible solutions are tested to ensure that they
will provide the required funotlon.
Implementation and rollow-up Phase * The proposal is now
written up and submitted to management for adoption*
ftlles, op* olt *. p* 2*K




Lnoe the proposal is submitted, it must be followed up
periodically in order to monitor its progress.
The formal use of a job plan assures that all elements of
value engineering are given comprehensive consideration.
Of all the phases within the job plan, the development
of alternatives whioh can accomplish the required function is
perhaps the most difficult step. The search for alternatives is
a highly oreatlve process. It requires the generation of new and
"bright" ideas. Old conventions and mental attitudes whioh tend
to Inhibit oreatlve thinking must be eliminated. Since much has
been written on the oreatlve process, it will not be discussed in
this paper. It is sufficient to note that value engineering
requires real imagination and creativity, particularly in the
seleotion of alternatives.
Application
Value engineering is concerned mostly with hardware and
end-item products. It may be applied to hardware during its
conception, development, engineering or production stages. It is
also used on a wide variety of nonhardware products. Some
examples ares (1) preparation of technical manuals, specifica-
tions, and drawings, (2) establishment of requirements for data,
and (3) report preparation. This paper centers its discussion of
value engineering on its application to hardware, and particularly
defense hardware.
An excellent discussion on the creative process is con-
tained in Newman and Summer, The Process of Hanagement . op. olt ..
pp. 276-296.
Miles, op. olt .. p. 43.
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Although value engineering is applicable at any point in
the life oyole of the produot involved, and on a wide range of
products, practical considerations diotate that it be limited to
those products and phases of products where there is a high
potential for cost reduction. In any organisation the resources
that can be allotted to a value-engineering program are limited.
To realise the full potential of the program, the value-
engineering team needs a oriteria to decide when and where value
engineering should be applied. One Army command pictures the
problem this way:
A poor ohoioe of the object of a value-engineering study
will produce small savings no matter how well the study is
accomplished. Because manpower resources limit the number
of possible value-engineering studies over a period of time,
it is mandatory the studies be conducted in areas where the
greatest gains will be realized.1
There are no hard and fast rules as to where or when the
application of value-engineering techniques will result in signi-
ficant cost savings. As a general rule, however, substantial
savings should result when applied to products in the following
instances: ! (1) products purchased in large quantities, (2) pro-
ducts where design is pushing the state of the art, (3) highly
complex products, (k) products which have had accelerated develop-
ment programs, and (5) high-cost products.
The earlier value engineering is applied in the life
oyole of a product, the greater the potential savings. Early
U.S., Department of the Array, Criteria I-or ^election of
Value Analysis/Engineering iroduots
.
( Washington , D . C. : Head -
quarters, Army Material Command, 1964), p. 13.
2Ibld.

application means that there are more units of production to
which cost-reduction changes will be applied. Also, the earlier
the change, especially If It can be made before production be-
gins, the lower the Implementing costs will be from the stand-
point of modifications to production lines, tooling, procedures,
etc., and changes to logistics and support elements such as
spares and maintenance manuals. The advantages of early value
engineering are illustrated in figure 3» This graph Is based on
the experience with value engineering In the Department of the
2
Army.
While early application Is desirable, it is not always
practical. In the design stage of the product, for instance,
several factors limit the application of value engineering. ?he
design engineer Is primarily motivated by the pressures to
develop a product to meet performance specifications. He Is
trained to think in terms of safety margins rather than in terms
of costs.-' One observer notes that the design engineers
rewards are generally related to performance, not cost:
The designer Is rarely praised for doing a good Job on
cost or criticized for doing a bad Job on cost. He is
highply praised for releasing a design that meets performance
requirements and Is criticized for either missing a schedule
or falling to produce a design that will perform. Naturally,
Value anglneerlng Handbook , pp. olt . . p. 2^.
Harry 0. Hues, Value Analysis (Value Engineering) .
(Army -hemioal Center, ftd. * U.S. Army Biological-iadiological
Engineering Group, 19ol), p. 6.
-Personal interview with Hr« John houndalexls. Chief,
Management engineering branch, offloe of Management Services,
















his Interests are forced away from cost and almost entirely
toward product performance .1
Another factor restricting the use of value engineering in
the design stage is related to the difficulty of actually accom-
plishing value engineering. It is easier to apply value engineer-
ing to an existing product than to a product in the conceptual
stage*
Because of the above constraints, value engineering finds
its widest practical application early in the manufacturing
2
stage. Once the designer has developed the workable product, a
value-engineering team appraises the product from a functional
versus cost viewpoint in order to assure maximum value. This
"second look," when applied early in the product's life, generally
results in significant cost savings.
In all applications of value engineering, it is again
emphasized that the objective is to Identify and remove unnec-
essary cost, and thus Improve value. All this must be done with-
out reducing in the slightest degree the quality, safety, life,
reliability, dependability, and the other essential features
required by the customer. Too often in the past, an endeavor to
remove cost has resulted in the lowering of quality. The tech-
niques and standards of value engineering do not tolerate such
quality reductions. In fact, experience shows that quality is
ii.I. Knight, "Value engineering at the Design Level,"
Value Engineering—A Challenge to Kanageaent . (Washington, B.C.:
American Ordnance Association, 1963) » p. 11*
2
Personal interview with ftr* H« • oderick, Head, Value
ngiueering Branch, Department of the Uavy, January 23, 196?
•




frequently inoreased as a result of developing alternatives for
the accomplishment of desired function. / This will be discussed
further in Chapter V.
3tate of the Art
The theory of value engineering has not changed substan-
tially since its inception by Mr. Miles in the late 19z»0 , s. It
still starts with a simple idea—evaluate a product in terms of
what it does, not in terms of how it is made. Its objective is
to find another way of doing the same job, but one that will do
it more efficiently , and for much less money. Through the years
a number of ingenious approaches have been devised to apply these
simple techniques to whole range situations.
After a period of slow, but steady, growth, value
engineering has hit its stride. New programs are mushrooming
throughout industry and the results are being recorded in the
millions of dollars. There are countless reports of value-
2
engineering savings. Behind the new spurt are greater competi-
tive pressures, plus managements realization that value
engineering oan really deliver the goods.
Many large companies now have formal value-engineering
programs, Including regular training programs for key employees
of all departments. For instance, Westlnghouse has adopted a
formal program of value engineering as an integral part of its
cost-improvement program. It has reported savings in the
Hoderiok Interview, loc oit .
2The magazine. Purchasing , devotes one issue a year to
value-engineering case histories.
.
millions of dollars from tho program. ..'estinghouse President,
D.C. Burnham, points to value engineering as a key element in
the effort to provide better products to customers at lower
costs*
The unique feature of value engineering is that it is
applicable to small as well as large companies* The Small
Business Administration sums it up as follows:
The air—and the achl evement—of value analysis is to
reduce oosts on the product or process it is applied to. and
to do this without diminishing performance. Its principles
and techniques will work as well for the "do-it- himself"
small businessman as they do for the expert • • • • Regardless
of the size of the firm, the approach is basically the same. 2
Value engineering has long been recognized as a useful
cost-reduction tool within the Federal Government. It has been
suggested that value engineering was given its first start in the
early 1950 f s in the Defense establishment with the Navy's Bureau
of Ships. * The initial program was limited to in-house projects
at Government-owned industrial facilities and bases.
The DOD in-house. value-engineering program has produced
significant results In the past few years. As indicated in
Table 1. audited savings have increased from |?2 million in Fiscal
Year 1963 to 4^59 million in Fiscal 2ear 1967. This is exclusive
of the value-engineering savings realized through contractors.
1Paul V. Farrell (ed.), nV.A. at Westinghouse: Better
Products. Lower Cost," Purchasing . May 20. 1965» pp. &5-^7»
2Daniel D. iioman, "Value Analysis for Small Business,"
Technical Aids for Jmall Hamifacturers . (mall Business Adminis-
tration , Hay—June . 1964 ) , p . 1 •
^Koderiok Interview, loc. oit .
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The goal Is a 1500 Billion annual saving* by fiscal Year 196?«
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aSouroe : U.^., : apartment of defense, aeoords of the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Installations and Logistics.
One 000 official states that despite the impressive
gains, the overall value-engineering potential in the department
of defense is several times as great as actual achievement. To
approaoh the full potential, a number of new aotions are under-
way. These aotions Include the allocation of 265 additional
value-engineering billets in the three Military Departments and
the Defense Supply Agency. This Includes approximately 90
3billets assigned to the Department of the Navy.-' In Chapter IV,
the DOD in-house, value-engineering program will be compared with
the value-engineering effort in Defense contracts.
nummary and Conclusions
Value engineering is an organized effort that looks at
1 2
empter Interview, loo, olt . Ibid .
3itoderick Interview, loo, olt.
ft*es«V". £r*o.G : O.ft S#
"<'
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the function of a product rather than the product itself. It
attempts to identify areas of excessive or unnecessary costs,
thereby improving value. It provides the same or better per-
formance at lower costs, but does not reduce either the quality
or reliability.
A successful value-engineering study begins with the
proper choice of products with overall cost-reduotl on potential.
Generally, value-engineering studies are directed toward high
cost, highly complex items, and Items produced in large quanti-
ties. The study then proceeds in a systematic step-by-step
analysis of the problem and the development of a solution.
It is clear, from the evidence presented in this ohapter,
that the techniques of value engineering are well developed and
have been proven useful as a cost-reduction tool. Large and
small companies have realized significant oost savings by utiliz-
ing the techniques of value engineering. In short, the state of
the art is well advanced. Thus, in using value-engineering
incentives in contracts, the Government Is not faced with develop*
lng or advancing the state of the art. It need only to motivate
contractors to apply value-engineering techniques to defense
products, thereby lowering overall procurement costs. The use of
value-engineering incentives in defense contracts will be






VALUE ENG1 RG CONTRACTUAL INCENTIVES
Introduction
Cost reduction and cost effectiveness, which currently
characterize the entire spectrum of Department of Defense activi-
ties, were examined in Chapter II, which traced the efforts of
the Government to harness the profit motive to work for the
effective and economical performance of contracts. In Chapter
III, value engineering was shown to be a powerful tool for
attaining the objectives of cost reduction. It follows, then,
that the Government can realize significant cost savings if
defense contractors use value engineering. This chapter traces
and analyzes the recent efforts of the Department of Defense to
motivate industry to use value-engineering techniques when per-
forming defense contracts.
Historical background
Value-engineering incentive clauses were first incorpor-
ated in the Armed Services Procurement Regulation in 1959» *he
regulation specified that command approval was necessary for the
incentive clauses to be used in contracts. Relatively little use
was made of these initial value-engineering clauses, and the




resultant cost savings were Insignificant. In 1962, major
emphasis was placed on the use of value engineering as part of
the new DOD Cost-Reduotlon Program* To breathe new life into the
program, the original incentive clauses were revised extensively,
first, provisions were added which gave the Government the option
to either require or encourage contractors to perform value-
2
engineering studies. In Jceember, 1962, another revision
grouped all contractual provisions concerning value engineering
into a new Part 17 . Seotion I of ASPtt.-* It also established re-
quirements for the inclusion of value-engineering clauses in
specific contracts.
The 1962 revisions contained little profit incentive
relative to the cost risk Involved in undertaking value-
engineering studies. The result of the regulations was wide-
spread refusal of contractors to aocept the clauses and to partl-
oipate in value-engineering efforts. To cope with this
resistance, a 1963 revision was made whioh offered more incentive
by appeal to the profit motive.^
Early in 196**, the National Security Industrial Associa-
tion polled a select group of defense contractors regarding their
reactions to the most recent value-engineering incentives. The
study revealed that 37 per cent of the 160 respondents felt that
Nash, op. olt .. p. 106.
2
A3P:-i, revision 3 (i960 hdition), March 15, 1962.
ibiQ. • revision 13 (i960 edition), Leoeaber 9* 1962.
k
Nash, op. olt .. p. 106.
*ASP& a ievision 3 (1963 Edition), November, I963.
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"lack of real incentives" was a major roadblock, keeping the DQD
value-engineering program from reaching- its full potential. In
addition, 52 per cent cited "short contractual periods" as a road-
block. 1
This survey lead to further investigations and Inquiries
on the use of value-engineering incentives* The findings indi-
cated that the contractors did not feel that incentives keyed
solely to the reduction in the costs of the current program were
sufficient to motivate full contractor participation. Based on
this information, the DGD again revised and broadened the incen-
tives. The new clauses, which were announced in Defense
xrooureoent Circular No. 11, are those which are currently in
force.
Contractual Irovisions
The Armed Services Procurement regulation currently lists
two kinds of value-engineering provisions! (1) value-engineering
incentives which provide for the contractor to share in cost
reductions that ensue from change proposals he submits, and (2)
value-engineering program requirements whioh obligate the con-
tractor to maintain value-engineering efforts in accordance with
an agreed program, and provide for contractor sharing in cost
George £• 1 ouch, "The Way of Value engineering Incen-
tives," Proceedings of the Series of Briefing Sessions on ~efense
Procurement Clroular Ho* 11 . (Washington. D.C. t oooiety of
American Value Engineers, 1965). P» ^*
2U.o., department of defense, Jefenae Procurement
Circular Mo. 11 . October 9, 1964.
'
reductions ensuing from change proposals he submits*
Incentive r£yps « the objective of the value-engineering,
incentive-type provision is to encourage the contractor to
develop and submit to the Government proposals for changes in the
contract specification, purchase description, or statement of
work which would reduce the overall cost of the contract, or
otherwise result in collateral savings to the Government*
Generally, the changes submitted under this provision are aimed
at the elimination or modification of any requirements found to
be in excess of actual needs. Under the value-engineering
clauses, a contractor submits a cost-reduction change proposal.
If the Government accepts the proposal under this provision, the
Government and the contractor share In the resulting overall oost
savings, rhe basis for the sharing formula Is discussed later in
this chapter,
Ihe Procurement regulation requires that, with several
exceptions, a value-engineering, incentive-type clause be Included
2in all contracts in excess of ,100,000. the significant excep-
tions are: (1) certain cost-reimbursement contracts, (2)
commercial products where the design and cost are controlled by
the commercial market, (3) where a value-engineering, program-
type clause is in the oontract, and (k) when the head of the pro-
curing activity determines that value engineering offers no
potential oost reduction.** The value-engineering. Incentive-type
clause may also be included lr certain contracts under £100,000.




. rogram Type * The value-engineering, program-type pro-
vision differs from the inoentive-type provision In that It
obligates the contractor to engage In value engineering at a
level of effort determined by the Government and stated as an
item of work In the contract schedule. The program-type provision
requires a continuing value-engineering effort by the contractor
and the submission to the Government of reports reflecting the
1
results of such effort.
A3p.i states that the principle reason for requiring a
formal value-engineering program is to get earlier results; i.e.,
in the initial stages of the design, development, or production
so that the specifications, drawings, and production methods will
2
reflect the full benefit of value engineering. The program-type
olause, like the incentive-type, provides for sharing of savings
resulting from the adoption of change proposals.
The program-type olause must be included in all CPPP con-
tracts in excess of one million dollars unless specifically
exempted by the head of the procuring agency. Also, in special
cases where the lack of a firm job description exists, the
program-type olause may be substituted for the Incentive-type
clause in CPIF contracts. In no case, however, may a program-type
clause be included in a formally advertised contract.-*
Sharing Plan . Experience with earlier value-engineering
contractual provisions clearly demonstrated that cost reduction





utilize the techniques of value engineering. This motivation was
sought in later revisions by strengthening the appeal to the
profit motive. The provisions announced by Defense Procurement
Circular No* 11 oontalned two principal elements. First, the
contractor must be assured of a fair proportion or share of any
value-engineering savings? and second, he must be assured that
his share will be applied to a substantial base.
In an effort to fully exploit the large cost-reduction
potential of value engineering, the following policy was
established:
It is Department of Defense policy to be generous in
incentive arrangements so long as it is assured that it is
being generous only with definite cost-reduction savings.
This polloy reflects the facts that the Government will
benefit from any value-engineering savings, the definitely
assured savings from successful value engineering are likely
to be only a part of the overall savings and a generous
incentive tied to definitely assured savings offers maximum
likelihood of the Government realizing the full overall
savings potential*1
Under the earlier provisions, contractors were often
reluctant to invest in value-engineering programs beoause the
sharing of realized savings was limited to a small base; i.e.,
the current contract. Contractors considered this to be unfair,
especially since the Government's savings extended to all future
oontracts. Xhe revised regulations were designed to eliminate
this inhibiting feature by providing for contractor sharing of
2future acquisition savings. The current clauses provide that
the sharing period may be as much as three years, but In no event
should It be less than one year. In addition, provisions were
X
Afl?E fl 1-1703.Kb). 2Ibld .. 1-1703.3.
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made to facilitate contractor sharing where collateral savings in
operations, logistic support, and other areas may accrue to the
Government*
The precise extent to which the contractor shares in the
cost must be tailored to the particular procurement. The per-
centage of the savings which goes to the contractor is propor-
tional to the risk he assumes under the contract. Contracts with
the incentive-type clause provide for the greatest contractor
percentage share. In fixed-prloe-type contracts, and contracts
awarded under adequate price competition, the contractor's share
is normally $0 per cent and may be as much as 75 per cent. This
percentage varies according to the certainty of estimated savings.
Normally, the contractor's percentage share in future acquisition
2
savings is considerably less than those on the current contract.
In contracts with the value-engineering, program-
requirement-type clause, the share of the cost savings is much
smaller. It ranges from a maximum of 25 per cent in an FJPI-type
contract to 5 P*r cent in a CPFF-type contract.-3 These low per-
centages reflect the fact that the cost of the contractor's
value-engineering effort requirements is taken into account when
the contract price is negotiated.
Cost-iieduotion Proposals . Value-engineering contract
clauses apply only to cost-reduction proposals which require a
change to the contract. The proposal is submitted in the form of
a
a Value Engineering Change Proposal (VECP). The contractor
XM&m. 1-1703.**. 2Ibld .. l-17G*Ko).
3Ibld .. l-170Mc). **Ibld .. 1-1706.
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Includes in the WBCf all the details of the recommended change in
the contract's specifications and the requirements which lead to
a cost reduction. An estimate of the resultant savings is also
included in the VECP.
The Government carefully evaluates the VECP and confirms
or modifies the savings estimated by the contractor. If the VECP
is accepted t the Government becomes the owner of all the amended
drawings, specifications, and other related ideas, and may use
them in future contracts with the same, or other contractors.
Cqntraptor fr^nd^ng
Comprehensive value-engineering programs add significant
overhead to the cost of performing a contract. Under the value-
engineering, incentive-type clause, the Government encourages,
but does not require, a value-engineering program. For this
reason, the contractor bears all the costs of his value-
engineering efforts. However, he Is allowed up to 75 par cent of
the cost savings resulting from his efforts. This high percent-
age reflects consideration of the contractor's financial risk in
the performance of studies which lead up to the opportunity to
share cost savings.
In contrast with the program-requirement-type clause, the
contractor's costs to oonduet a formal value-engineering program
is refleoted in the overall contract prioe. The Government
places no maximum limits for direct funding of contracts with the
mandatory value-engineering requirement. However, over a period
of time, the ratio of net savings achieved to costs incurred
should exceed 10 to 1; in other words, for every dollar spent for
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value engineering, the activity should recover ten or more
dollars*
In negotiating a contract with a program-requirement-type
clause, the negotiators must determine a reasonable level of
value-engineering effort* At this stage, the 10 to 1 ratio
criterion does not help the negotiators. In such oases, the
initial program level is normally set between 1/10 of 1 per cent
and 1/2 of 1 per cent of the total annual dollar volume of the
contract. As experience with the contractor's value-engineering
efforts is gained, the funds allotted to value-engineering
studies may be based on the contractor's past performance*
Subcontractor Effort
The new contract regulations announced in Defense Pro-
curement Circular No* 11 specifically encourage subcontractor
value-engineering programs* The prime contractors are expected
to encourage their subcontractors to fully utilize value-
engineering techniques* In return, the subcontractors' costs of
implementation and portion of value-engineering sharing are
recognized by the Government as part of the prime contractor's
cost to implement the 7£CP*^
Potential Cost savings
i&perienoe indicates that an intensive value-engineering
a
effort can produce cost savings of 15 to 25 per cent* The DOD
DGJ Value ifriislneerlnff Handbook , op, cit *. p. 36.
2Ibid . 3ASPH, 1-1707 to 1-1708.
a
Miles, op. cit .. p. 1.
...'.
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in-house programs have achieved up to 35 per cent cost savings on
Individual products* These percentages, which are supported in
part by the evidenoe presented in Chapter III, give some indica-
tion of the magnitude of the potential savings that may be
realized from defense contractor value-engineering programs.
The following example attempts to quantify this potential.
In Chapter I it was pointed out that DOB contract expenditures
exoeed ^30 billion annually. Suppose that less than one-third,
or $10 billion worth of these oontracts can be value engineered.
Also, suppose that only a modest 10-per cent cost reduction is
achieved on this 410 billion. Using these conservative assump-
tions, the potential overall savings is about one billion dollars
annually, even if the contractor shares in only 25 per oent of
this savings, the potential profit pool is $250 million. Con-
sidering that the Illustration is conservative on all estimates,
one uOL offiolal observed that value-engineering Incentives offer
2
the contractor a virtual "hunting license" to reap vast profits.
Industry Acceptance
Defense Procurement Circular No. 11 is the most recent
major revision of the value-engineering clauses. This circular
was based on five years 9 experience with value-engineering incen-
tives and was a major attempt to reconcile the interests of
Industry and Government. Since publication of the circular, the
revised value-engineering clauses are being Included In new
Pouch, op. clt .. p. 12.
2
Kempter Interview, loo, clt .
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contract awards* and many existing contracts are being modified to
incorporate the new clauses.
i'he response to the new clauses can be regarded as
favorable, The figures in Table 2 indicate that the cost savings
have almost doubled in three years, but the program is still
yery light when compared with the results of the DOD in-house,
value-engineering program (see Table 1, page ^5) • lor instance,
the DQL in-house program had cost savings of |%59 million in
Fiscal Year 1966, as compared to the contractor program savings
of $36 million in the same period.
TAbLL 2
ANNUAL BSTUUTED SAVINGS FHOR PABTRBNT OF
i HSfi COKXMACSOa KALUE-aaGIaEEHIRG PaOGHAft*




Source 1 U.S., Department of Defense, iscords of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and
Logistics.
The earlier value-engineering provisions in defense
contracts were essentially a one-sided affair. The Government
was the principal beneficiary of the program, with industry
receiving little benefit for its cost-reduction efforts.
Fouoh, op. clt .. p. 11.
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Although the Government has since become more generous by giving
the contractor more of a share of the savings, it remains for
much of industry to be convinced of this shift in policy, A DOD
official has observed that those contractors who have reaped
profits under the new provisions are the most enthusiastic
supporters of the program. But too many contractors still regard
it as just another cost-reduction program which offers them
little financial reward.
To stimulate new interest, DOE officials regularly con-
duct value-engineering seminars, conferences, and briefing
sessions in major cities. The purpose of these sessions is to
explain the procedural aspects of the value-engineering clauses
and gain industry* s acceptance of them. The sessions also give
DOD officials an opportunity to hear industry^ suggestions for
2
strengthening the program*
The annual increase in cost savings indicates that these
efforts have been at least a partial suocess. But industry
still voices a number of valid criticisms of the program. A
representative of one missile firm reported that when negotiating
a fixed -price contraot, every time his firm suggested a value-
engineering, cost-savings proposal, the Government negotiators
a
told them to "out that muoh more out of your price. nJ Other
firms complain that the incentive environment, while promising
higher profits, also requires increased capital expenditures and
1 2
Kempter Interview, loo, clt . Ibid .





research in order to be prepared for Government requirements*
one industry executive observed that value-engineering programs
put a drain on profit dollars because the Government negotiators
and the renegotiation Boards often do not allow recovery of these
cost8.
i efense officials recognize that improper or poor admini-
stration by Government contracting officers tends to negate
industry incentive. Local contracting officers are not fully
aware, or do not fully understand, the policies and objectives of
the value-engineering incentive clauses. To correct this situa-
tion, considerable emphasis is placed on educating and informing
key procurement officials of the value-engineering polioies and
requirements* Formal Dflf) in-house courses are offered to these
officials, and periodic conferences and training sessions are
conducted,
appraisal
Value-engineering incentives are not like other contract
incentives which provide rewards for performing efficiently in
accordance with the stated terms of the contract, nather, they
are rewards to the contractor for exercising initiative and tech-
nical ingenuity in identifying and successfully challenging the
stated terms of the contract, where those terms contain costly and
unessential restrictions. Industry has for many years complained
Louis J. L'Amore, "Will Total Incentive Picture Keen
Industry oags or aiohesV", Armed rorcea management . Aug. 1965*
pp. 57-60.
2Kempter Interview, loo, olt .
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of unrealistic Government requirements and specifications In
contracts. The value-engineering provisions of the Armed Services
Procurement Regulation offers the contractors an opportunity to
challenge those terms of the contract which contain costly and
unessential restrictions. The contractor Is afforded an oppor-
tunity to realize substantial profits while performing more
efficiently.
The current value-engineering incentives reflect the fact
that the taxpayer is not going to benefit unless the contractor
accepts the value-engineering challenge. The earlier clauses
failed as a oost-reduction tool because they channeled most of
the potential benefits to the Government. The current regulations
are more realistic. They specify that the Government •* policy is
to be generous In sharing the savings with the contractor. The
regulations are designed to enoourage full participation by
contractors, large and small. Since large-scale, widespread use
of value engineering will achieve substantial savings for the
taxpayer, the Government need not be concerned if the contractor
also realizes a generous share of the savings.
The value-engineering program got off to several false
starts in the early 1960's, The eagerness to obtain results and
the lack of experience in applying some of the procurement con-
cepts resulted in contractual provisions that were Impractical or
Ineffective, ieoent revisions of the regulations have corrected
many of the earlier defects. The value-engineering clauses now
appear to adequately harness the profit motive to work for
effective performance, i'he weakness of the program now appears
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to center around the administration of the program rather than
the contractual clauses* An educational program to inform
Government contract administrators of the objectives of the
value-engineering clauses should correct this weakness.
Conclusions
Value engineering is no longer an experimental program
based on vague regulations. The Government has clearly demon-
strated its determination to use value engineering as a major
cost-reduction tool in defense contracts.
This thesis questioned the value-engineering profit
potential open to contractors. It is evident that the Government
is now resolved to be generous with the contractors when sharing
cost savings. A contractor may realize up to 75 per cent of the
total estimate, savings. The savings base, to which this per-
centage applies, has been expanded to Include future acquisition
and collateral savings. Thus, on the basis of a sharing formula,
the potential profit is good.
In this chapter, an attempt was made to calculate the
total annual profit open to industry. Using very conservative
figures, the annual estimated cost savings was determined to be
about one billion dollars, of which 25 per cent represented the
contractor's profit potential. The writer concedes that the
above figures are only crude estimates of the profit potential
and are based on a very small sample of value-engineering results.
But they do serve as an indication of the huge profit potential




Cost savings for the Government and increased profits for
the contractor are the most obvious benefits from value engineer-
ing. Yet, there are many other benefits, direct and indirect,
which aoorue to both parti es. Chese benefits will be considered





In the preceding chapters, some of the results end bene-
fits of value engineering hare been mentioned. The purpose of
this chapter is to examine in detail the potential benefits
which aoorue to the Government and to the contractor through the
use of value engineering in defense contracts.
For discussion purposes, the results and benefits are
classified as direct and indirect. The dlreot results and bene-
fits are those which can be measured in terms of dollars whioh
are shared by the Government and the contractor. The indirect
benefits are those whioh cannot be, or are not, measured in terms
of dollars. They are often classified as fringe benefits of a
value-engineering program.
Within each of the above classifications, the benefits to
the Government and to the contractor are examined separately.
This is done with the knowledge and understanding that, in prac-
tical application, both parties may reoelve identical benefits
from a given value-engineering effort.
Direct Benefits
Government , xhe total annual direct benefits of a con-




57* These benefits are quantified in terms of dollars and shared
with the contractor in accordance with the terms of the contract.
The cost savings represent a reduction in the cost of the current
contract, a reduction in the cost of follow-on purchases, collat-
eral savings, or any combination of the three.
x'lve representative value-engineered products are graphi-
cally Illustrated in Appendix I. £aoh product is shown before
and after it was value-engineered, together with an estimation of
the cost savings. In some instances the unit cost reduction is
small, but the total savings is significant because of the volume
of items to which the value-engineering change applies.
^'l The exhibits in Appendix I do not disclose any pattern or
classification of items that can be value-engineered, -ucoessful
value-engineering efforts are so numerous and so diversified that
any grouping or classification is impossible. But one character-
istic does stand out. This characteristic is the seeming sim-
plicity of the change which resulted in lower costs. When
viewing before-and-after exhibits, one wonders why these simple
ideas weren't incorporated in the product's original design. But
as previously noted, time limitations imposed on a design engin-
eer, particularly in defense contracts, usually do not allow him
sufficient time to consider the product In terms of value.
This demonstrates the need for the seoond look at a product in a
systematic manner by personnel who oonsider the product primarily
in terms of value. It Is this seoond look that results in










substantial direct oost savings*
recently, the Department of Defense undertook a Value-
engineering Genesis study to determine what factors lead to the
greatest cost savings. The study was accomplished by the DOD
on a sample of 415 successful Class I and Class II value*
engineering changes during Fiscal Year 19&5* Class I changes
are those which require a modification in the prime contract,
whereas Class II ohanges require no such modification. Areas of
study included value-engineering efforts which were prompted, by
additional design effort, excessive cost of product, questioning
specifications and changes in the user*s needs. The study indi-
cated that rarely does any single factor oause value-engineering
cost savings. For example, it was found that in Class I ohanges,
excessive oost of the current design of a product and the
questioning of specifications accounted for 56 per cent of the
savings. In the Class II changes, additional design effort and
excessive oost of current design aooounted for 42 per cent and
16 per cent of the savings, respectively. A complete summary of
the findings of the Genesis study is contained in Figure 4.
Definitions of the terms used in the study are contained in
Appendix II.
The direct benefits to the Government, expressed qualita-
tively in dollars saved, is the major objective of the value-
2
engineering incentive clauses. The indirect or fringe benefits
U.S., Department of defense, Value Engineering Genesis
Study
.
(Washington, i>*Q*t Office of the Assistant Secretary of
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of the inoentive clauses are valuable, but are secondary to their
cost-reduction features. It is apparent* therefore, that the
Government oonsiders the direct benefits or cost savings to be
the primary justification for the program.
Contractor , It has been stated that the sharing arrange-
ments are such that the contractor never benefits unless the
2Government benefits. This is especially true when considering
the dlreot-dollar benefits which the contractor receives from
successful cost-reduction proposals, i'he contractor share of the
savings acts to increase the total profit of the contract.
It was pointed out in Chapter IV that contractors did not
respond to the early Incentive provisions because their share of
the direct cost savings was small. But as their share was
lnoreased, their value-engineering effort Improved. It appears,
therefore, that the contractors 1 share of the dlreot cost savings
is the primary incentive to them to engage in value engineering.
Indirect or Fringe Benefits
Generally, Indirect or fringe benefits cannot be accu-
rately measured In terms of dollars, but they are an important
element in the contractor's profit picture and the Government's
quest for economy. For this reason, the cost-reduotion aspect of
value engineering, however important in itself, should not be the
sole reason for enoouraglng or engaging in a value-engineering
.:very comprehensive article on value engineering
researched by the writer placed major emphasis on the use of
value engineering as a cost-reduction tool.











Government . Value engineering results in better defense
products. This is the most Important fringe benefit of the con-
tractor value-engineering program. Product Improvement is
possible because the value-engineering effort normally simplifies
the design of the produot.
The growing complexity of military products and weapons
systems makes it increasingly difficult to maintain a high stand-
ard of produot reliability and maintainability. The desire for
more sophisticated weapons is necessary, but it often results in
performance overkill—performance for performance's sake. The
high performance characteristics of individual components are
often far beyond the useful capability of the system of whioh it
is a part. Value engineering simplifies the produot by eliminat-
ing or reducing the number of parts Involved. In theory, this
Improves its reliability, maintainability and performance.
This theory Is supported by a study conducted by the
American Ordnance Association. The Association studied 124
representative samples of implemented value-engineering changes
to determine the effect of the changes on the product. The
results indicated Improved reliability in 44 per cent of the cases
studied, improved quality in 38 per cent, and improved maintain-
ability in 40 per cent. Also, in 21 per cent of the oases, per-
formance was actually improved. In only 3 pe* cent of the oases
oderiok Interview, loo, olt .
U.S., department of defense. Fringe Effects of Value
jlnfi, (War
pp. 10-18,
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did functional performance decrease. A graphical summary of the
findings of the study is contained In Figure 5» Definitions of
terms used In the study are contained In Appendix III.
The contribution of value engineering to the performance,
reliability and maintainability of defense products is a highly
desirable fringe benefit* However, this feat in Itself is not
impressive, rhere are many programs which Improve the performance
and characteristics of products. But there are few that boast of
such accomplishments at a net cost savings.
Contractor . The indirect or fringe benefits for the con-
tractor are no less impressive than those which accrue to the
Government. one of these benefits are obvious, while others can
only be speculated upon.
One valuable by-product is an Improved, cost-conscious
atmosphere throughout the company. This is a highly desirable
result, since the lack of this climate is an environmental factor
that originally prompted the need for value engineering. This
Improved atmosph re contributes to profit in such a way that the
value-engineering program never receives the credit. One
authority aooepts this lack of recognition as normal. He cites
the following examples
• • • as the result of attending a value engineering
training course, an administrator, after taking a funotion-
oriented look at the paperwork activity of his section, may
deoide to eliminate many useless forms, reports, and records.
This may result in significant savings both in terms of
people's time and In materials purchased. But the savings
will usually not be chalked up to value engineering. This is
not to say that the value engineering group should, or even
wants to, take credit for this profit contribution. «hat is
important is that management recognize that such contributions
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Employees are motivated In many ways to improve their
company's operations* Management oust recognise that value
engineering provides a new channel through whioh many helpful
suggestions may be received. One observer noted:
As an interesting by-product # I might mention the
apparent effect that our lvalue engineering"} program has had
on the Beneficial Suggestion Program* We find that the
employees seem to prefer to work through the value analysis
program rather than submit suggestions through the suggestion
program for possible cash awards* • • • the employees seem
more interested in getting the corrective action* eliminating
the unnecessary work* rather than the cash award.
2
Ihe value-engineering effort emphasises the goal of the
organisation to reduce costs* Once employees recognise and
become committed to this organisational goal, they are capable of
greater production and also of innovations whioh reduce costs far
•a
beyond the best efforts of the cost-reduction engineers.
The ASPu value-engineering clauses apply only to cost-
reduction proposals which require a formal change in the contract
specification* Many proposals do not require a change in the
contract specifications* In such oases, the contractor share of
the savings is often greater than when a contract change is
required* For instance, the contractor realises the total
savings under a firm-fixed-price contract* srfith the Increased
Falcon* op* clt *. p. 96.
2
L.B* St* Petery, "Employee Motivation Through Value
Analysis," bQ"0 In-house Value Engineering Conference . February,
1964* (Washington. l.C.i U*S* Government Printing Office, 196*0,
P. *5.
-'idgar H. oohein. organisational Psychology . (j£nglewood




emphasis on fixed-price-type contraots, this potential fringe
benefit is highly significant.
lhe Government is now taking into consideration the
contractor's past performance when selecting future contract
sources and when negotiating profit levels* Under recently
revised rules, the contractor's value-engineering activities in
past contracts are considered in awarding new negotiated con-
tracts. This provision enables the contractor to receive
additional recognition for his value-engineering efforts. It
provides a valuable fringe benefit for the superior contractor.
Cost overruns are always a nagging problem, especially in
research and development contracts. An active value-engineering
program in the early development stages helps the contractor
2
reduoe unnecessary oosts which contribute to cost overruns.
The fact that this application of value engineering may not show
up in a formal cost-reduction proposal does not make it any less
important to the overall good of the oompany.
The above are only samples of the potential fringe bene-
fits of an active value-engineering program. It is not important
that these fringe benefits be carefully measured and recorded.
But it is Important that management recognizes that they do exist.
Conclusions
Value-engineering benefits extend far beyond the scope of
U.S., department of Defense, Guide to Contractor Per-
formance evaluation
.
(Washington, D«C*i U.b. Government Printing
office, 1966), p. 32.
2John Van de Water, "VA. 1965: New Growth, Bigger Pay-
off," Purchasing , Hay 20, 1965- P* 39.
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the formal value-engineering program. With the limited resources
available for national defense, a program that provides better
products at lower cost ultimately means better national defense*
For the contractor, the value-engineering effort lowers the
price of his products, thereby making him more competitive when
bidding on future defense and nondefense contracts. These, and
the many other direct and fringe benefits, make value engineering





Considering the favorable attributes of the oontraotor
value-engineering program which are enumerated in Chapter V, the
results thus far have not been impressive. The direct cost
savings in Fiscal Year 1966 of £18 • 7 million are only a fraction
of the total potential. When compared with the results of the
DOD ln-house program, which produced savings of $^59 million in
the same year, the results are rather disappointing.
This meager showing does not discredit value engineering,
which has been proved to be an effective cost-reduction tool.
Lather, it suggests that there are constraints within the con-
tracting environment which tend to negate the Incentive to
conduct a full-fledged value-engineering program. Some of these
constraints are required in the interests of the overall pro-
curement activities. Others are not. This chapter examines
some of the problem areas and the implications of these problems
for the future of the value-engineering program.
Multiple Incentives
Value-engineering incentives are just one of a large
family of cost-reduction incentives used by the Government to




shifting from non-competitive to competitive procurements and
the greater use of PPP-, FPI- and -type contracts were
examined in Chapter II* Some of the new incentive arrangements
inolude irojeot Definition, hulti-year Procurement, Weighted
Guidelines, and the Total-Faokage-Prooursment Concept (TPPC).
UPC is a complex contract arrangement developed by the Air Force
and used for the first time in the multi-billion-dollar C-5A
program.
Increased competition and the use of incentive-type
contracts are oredlted with the greatest portion of cost savings
2in defense procurements. However, the Incentive-type contracts
enumerated above focus the profit motive on profit earned on a
single contract by bettering the specific goals set forth in
that contract. These complex incentive arrangements are gener-
ally limited to large research and development contracts and
other multl -mi111 on-dollar procurements. Value-engineering
incentives, on the other hand, are applicable to a wide cross
section of Government contracts, both large and small.
In any specific large contract, the savings potential
through value-engineering incentives is relatively small when
compared to the other cost-reduction and cost-prevention incen-
tives. For this reason the benefits of the incentives are often
1John ftechlin, "The Ordeal of the Plane Makers,
"
Fortune . ~ec. 19&5* ?• *58.




overlooked or relegated to a position of minor Importance, This
is unfortunate, for even if the savings potential is not large
when compared to the other incentives, it is still rather sub-
stantial in terss of dollars. Value-engineering incentives
complement other incentives and are a vital element in the total
oost-reduotion effort,
rroflt -redetermination
Value-engineering Incentives afford the contractor an
opportunity to realise significant excess profit over and above
the normal profit usually earned under the Government contracts.
The ingenious and efficient contractor who takes advantage of
this opportunity has every right to anticipate sizable profits.
out the knowledgable Government contractor Is aware that this is
not always the case*
There are several restrictions which prevent the con-
tractor from earning excessive profits, whether or not the
profits can be retained depends ultimately on the position taken
by the renegotiation Board, recognizing the uncertainties of
this situation* the DGD t with the support of the National
Aeronautics and opaoe Administration U.AoA), has made a presenta-
tion to the renegotiation *oard covering the incentive program,
with the view that the aboard should favorably recognize these
2provisions when considering fair profits.
\tempter Interview, loc. olt .
2
C.C. Van Vechten and J.C. Ferren, "Contractual Aspects,"
Value Engineering—A Challenge to Management
.
( Washington , . C . i
American Ordnance Association, 1963) • P* !•
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In Fiscal Year 1966, the Board made 21 determinations of
excessive profits totaling £24,513,962. Prom Its inception in
1951 t the Board has made 3 #373 determinations of excessive profits
totaling *936,*t55,823« Letermlnations of excessive profits are
made on the basis of aggregate profits of the contractor on all
Government contraots for a full year. Favorable recognition is
given to the efficiency of the contractor, with particular regard
to the attainment of quantity and quality production, reduction
of costs, and economy in the use of materials, facilities and
manpower. Credit is also allowed for Federal and State lnoome
taxes .^
Thus, fiscal-year renegotiation, which deals with aggre-
gate profits, is entirely different from price adjustment or
redetermination of individual contraots pursuant to contract
provisions. While in theory, value-engineering efforts are given
favorable recognition, large profits attained through this effort
may very well be lost in the Board 9 s final determination of
allowable profit.
An official of the Renegotiation Board states that the
Board is Inclined to give favorable recognition to efforts such
as value engineering. But he believes that it is largely an
academic problem beoause, to date, very few contracts have
refleoted large v \lue-englneering profits.
U.S., The renegotiation Board, Eleventh Annual :eport .
(Washington, D.C. i U.S. Government Printing offioe, 1966), p. 9*
2Ibld . 3Ibld .
Personal Interview with ftr. F.tt. Lunkin, office of
renegotiation Review, i'he renegotiation Board, March 11, 1967.
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The manner in whloh the henegotiation Board evaluates
the contractor's profit level makes it difficult to determine
the Board *s effect on value-engineering profits. But it is
apparent that the mere presence of the Board has a discouraging
effeot on any contractor who has Ideas about earning high levels
of profit, legally or otherwise.
Administrative problems
Host new programs encounter initial administrative
difficulties, i'he value-engineering program is no exception.
i*iany of the early problems have been solved, borne of the
current problems center around the processing of the cost-
reduction change proposals. These proposals are processed by
many different contracting officers throughout the country. It
was pointed out in Chapter IV that these officers are often
unfamiliar with the aims and objectives of the program. As a
result, the proposals are occasionally treated with Indifference
or processed inconsistently with the real objectives of the
2program. The training programs now being conducted by the DOD
and the individual services should eventually eliminate these
inhibiting factors.
Another very real administrative problem is the difficulty
of estimating the true savings of a value-engineering change
proposal and, as a result, the amount of money the contractor
should receive for submitting the proposal. 31nee the savings
base takes into account present, future, and collateral savings,
1 2kempter Interview, loo, olt . Ibid .
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a considerable amount of research and documentation is required
to arrive at a fair determination, A contracting offioer has
wide latitude in determining the savings base. His interpreta-
tion of the Government policy to be generous can mean the
difference between meager and substantial profits*
oaipt. consistent and fair administration of the cost-
reduction proposals is a prerequisite if the value-engineering
program is to approach its full potential. It will be reaohed
only to the extent that the Government resolves the vexing
administrative problems.
The future
Most new programs are beset with problems during their
early life. The contractor value-engineering program is no excep-
tion. Its false starts and difficult administrative problems
have undoubtedly retarded its growth. Yet. despite the complica-
tions, the program is well launched and has a bright future.
This optimistic forecast for the program is shared by top
management within DOD. Defense officials see value engineering
as one of the best tools available for obtaining true cost
savings. Impressed by the success of the ODD in-house program,
they are determined to transfer this success to the procurement
program.
uefense officials recogni.se the problems which currently
hamper the program and have taken actions to resolve them.
Government procurement personnel are being trained in both the
Kempter Interview, loc. clt .
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management and the principles of application of value engineer-
ing. Industry is regularly kept abreast of the program through
literature, conferences and symposia. Contractor value-
engineering efforts are given considerable publicity. Cost-
saving results similar to those illustrated in Appendix I are
compiled quarterly and widely disseminated. This public recogni-
tion is designed to give credit for past accomplishments as well
as to stimulate new and wider use of the program.
All this aotlvity focuses on the elimination of real and
perceptual roadblocks to a successful value-engineering effort.
«lth the affirmative support of top DOC officials, there is
every reason to believe that the program will produce even




perlor economic strength Is vital to the nation's
security. This strength depends. In part, upon the efficient
allocation of the limited resources at the natlon*s disposal.
Over the years, a variety of programs have been adopted by the
Federal Government to promote the efflolent allocation and econom-
ical use of resources, of the various programs used by the
Government, none have been more comprehensive or as thoroughly
organized as the oost-reduction program Initiated by the Depart-
ment of Defense In Klscal Year 1962,
Cost reduction In defense procurements Is a major element
of the DOD program. Cost savings have been realised through
various mechanisms Including Increased competition and more exten-
sive use of Inoentlve-type contracts and Incentive clauses. The
Incentives for cost reduction are designed to positively motivate
contractors to seek out and eliminate waste and unnecessary costs
when performing defense contracts. It has been found that con-
tractors respond most favorably when the cost-reduction Incentives
appeal to the profit motive. To harness the profit motive. Incen-
tives have been developed which offer the contractor greater




The objective of cost-reduction and cost-prevention
incentives is to obtain more and better defense items at lower
costs, quality, performance, and reliability may not be sacri-
ficed in the interest of economy. To meet this objective, value-
engineering incentives have been included in a number of defense
contracts.
Value engineering is essentially an organized effort
directed toward achieving the required function of an item at the
lowest possible cost. Defense hardware items are especially
amenable to the value-engineering process because the pressure to
develop new and complex items in short time frames often results
in unnecessary costs. The value-engineering approaoh is to
identify and eliminate excessive or unnecessary costs, thereby
Improving value. The end result is an item which can perform the
required function at a lower cost.
The use of value-engineering incentives in contracts was
prompted in part by the success of the DOD ln-house, value-
engineering efforts at shipyards, bases, industrial facilities
and other Government-owned activities. Organized value-
engineering efforts at these activities have produced substantial
cost savings as well as significant fringe benefits.
In an effort to transfer this success to the area of
defense procurements, value-engineering incentive clauses have
been incorporated into the Armed bervioes Procurement regulation.
The current procurement clauses provide that the Government may
either require or merely encourage a defense contractor to per-








the profit motive by sharing the cost savings with the oon-
traotor. The contractor's share of the savings Is proportional
to the financial risk he assumes In developing ecst-reduotl on
proposals* The DOD policy Is to be generous with the contractor
In sharing the resultant savings.
The contractor value-engineering program has achieved
only limited success when compared to the DOD In-house program.
It Is believed that this limited success Is due In part to the
newness of the program and the many administrative problems which
are Inherent In any new program. Inconsistent and Improper
handling of the contractors* cost-reduction proposals In the
early phases of the program, coupled with token-profit Incentives,
may have given the program a poor Image Initially.
Officials of the Department of Defense have been quick to
recognize the program's shortcomings and have taken positive
corrective action. Profit Incentives have been strengthened.
Administrative procedures have been Improved, and a training pro-
gram on the administration of the value-engineering Incentives
has been Initiated. Onoe the objectives of the Incentives are
widely known and the cost-reduction proposals are processed con-
sistently and fairly , It Is believed that the defense contractors
will look with new Interest upon the program's Improved profit
potential and Increase their value-engineering efforts accordingly,
It appears that the renegotiation Board Is more of a
perceptual than a real deterrent on the contractor's Incentive to
conduct a value-engineering program. But It would appear to be In




to establish and publicise its position, on excessive profits
earned through a value-engineering effort* For this reason, it
is recommended that the DQb and other interested Agencies urge
the renegotiation ^oard to adopt and publish a policy which
allows the contractor to retain all excessive profits earned
under the value-engineering clauses. This is a reasonable re-
quest because the contractor never benefits under these clauses
unless the Government also benefits. Excessive profits earned
in this manner are a sure indication that the Government has
also received significant monetary and fringe benefits.
ihere are other reasons for the Government to be generous
in rewarding contractors for their cost-reduction efforts. Con-
tractors are inclined to put forth greater effort in their work
when their past efforts have been properly recognized. But the
failure to recognize past superior performance* especially when
it has been specifically solicited, usually kills any further
motivation to perform well.
ihe writer doesn't recommend generous rewards for minor
efforts. It is merely suggested that oontract administrators
should consider the overall objectives of the value-engineering
program when evaluating the cost-reduction proposals and inter-
pret liberally the LOu»s policy to be generous.
This thesis hypothesized that the contractor value-
engineering incentive olauses open many new avenues of oppor-
tunity for both Industry and Government. Industry has the
opportunity for vast new profits, and Government has the oppor-
tunity to obtain greater quantities of highly reliable goods for
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the funds available, respite the relatively modest results
which the program has produced to date* there is every reason to
accept this hypothesis without qualification. The environment
for cost reduction has never been more favorable within the
The techniques of value engineering are well established and
proved effective. The profit incentive offered by the program
is real, not token, defense officials are taking positive steps
to reduce or eliminate the significant obstacles which hamper
the effectiveness of the program. In short , there is every
reason to believe that, when all parties are fully aware of the
intent and the potential of the program, value engineering will
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DEFINITIONS OP TEBM8 USED IN T
VALUE ENGINEERING GENESIS STUDi
ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY: Incorporation of new materials, compo-
nents, techniques or processes (advances in the state-of-
the-art) not available at the time of the previous design
effort,
ADDITIONAL DESIGN KFFQHXl Application of additional skills,
ideas, and information available but not utilized during
previous design effort*
CHANGE IN USEH'S NEEDS t User's modification or redefinition of
mission, function, or application of item (change in user's
needs)*
FEEDBACK PBOM TESTS/USE t Design modification based on feedback
from user tests or field experience suggesting that specified
parameters governing previous design were unreallstio or
exaggerated,
QUESTIONING SPECIFICATIONS: User's specifications were examined,
questioned, determined to be inappropriate, out of date, or
overspeeified.
FICIENCIESi resign in use prior to VE change proved
inadequate in use (e.g., was characterized by inadequate
performance, excessive failure rates, or technical
deficiencies),
EXCESSIVE COST: Design In use prior to VE change proved techni-
cally adequate, but, through use of a cost model or
comparative costing techniques, it was determined that the





DEFINITIONS OP FlilNGE EFFECTS
:u£LI ABILIT1'—Ability to meet performance requirements for a
determined number of times
•
MAINTAINABILITY—Relative ease of repair or replacement.
PriODUCIBILITY—relative ease of repeatable manufacture*
HUMAN FACTO is—Acceptability of change related to neoessary
education or dexterity*
PAaTS AVAILABILITY— telatlre ease In obtaining or manufacturing
simplified or standard parts.
PRODUCTION LEAD TIKE—Elimination, standardization or simplifi-
cation of operations or materials.
QUALITY—Characteristics of parts to meet everything specified
consistently.
WEIGHT—Lighter In weight.
LOGISTICS—Quantity and complexity of parts needed for field
support of end Items.
PEttFO:iMANC£—Ability of the change to carry out the Intended
function at time of Initial test or qualification.
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